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Marxism and Cultural Studies in the Development of Axel Honneth’s Theory of Recognition 
Eleonora Piromalli 
 
Abstract This essay analyses the interaction between Marxism and Cultural Studies in the genesis of 
Honneth’s theory of recognition. I reconstruct the passages through which Honneth, by drawing on the 
writings of some of the major cultural theorists and in reference to the works of the young Marx, develops the 
conceptual foundations of his paradigm (I), with special attention to the themes of social labour and the 
relationship between work and recognition (II). I then point out the epistemic and practical qualities of 
Honneth’s theory in relation to its origins in Marxism and Cultural Studies; notably its capacity of detecting 
even the forms of social protest which have not yet reached the threshold of public expression, and its 
providing an explanation for those revolts which would otherwise seem to be only led by destructive rage 
(III). 
 
 
This essay documents the story of a successful interaction: by focusing on the early works of Axel Honneth, it 
retraces how Marxism and Cultural Studies concurred in the elaboration of Honneth’s theory of recognition, 
today widely considered among the leading paradigms in contemporary social and political philosophy.1 
Although Hegel is the main reference at the basis of Honneth’s most-read book The Struggle for Recognition 
(1992), it is through the interaction of Marxism and Cultural Studies that Honneth was able, in his first works 
– published in the early 1980 – to determine the very relevance of the principle of recognition for a critical 
social theory: the deepest layers of his paradigm result from the interaction between the British and American 
tradition 
of Cultural Studies (B. Moore, E. P. Thompson, R. Sennett), on the one hand, and Marxism, on the other, both 
conjugated with theoretical impulses deriving from the Habermasian theory of communicative action. Even 
though Honneth has been revising and refining his paradigm of recognition over the years, its conceptual core 
has remained unaltered – as can be noticed in Honneth’s latest book, Das Recht der Freiheit (2011). 
The first part of this essay provides a brief reconstruction of how, moving from a critique to the neo-Kantian 
approaches of Apel and Habermas in his  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 For a comprehensive, detailed and accurate study on Honneth’s theory of recognition, see Deranty 2009. 
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early writings, Honneth starts inquiring into the forms of the everyday practical morality of the working 
classes. Thanks to the works of R. Sennett, B. Moore and E. P. Thompson, he sheds light on the moral 
expectations, the intuitively presupposed conceptions of justice, and the normative reactions that characterise 
the ‘hidden morality’ of the working classes, which he, drawing on the Marxian concept of non-alienated 
work, traces back to the common denominator of a need for social recognition of one’s work and role in the 
social cooperation. In later writings (examined in Section II), Honneth uses Barrington Moore’s categories of 
‘panhuman sense of injustice’ and of ‘implicit social contract’ as the theoretical links for attributing the claim 
for social recognition to every emancipative struggle, not only to class-based ones; in doing so, he will 
nonetheless preserve in his theory the Marxist idea of social dignity in the act of working, as well as the 
Marxian motive of history as an ongoing process of social conflicts, re-defined in terms of ‘struggles for 
recognition’. The last section of the essay shows how the instrument of recognition permits to detect even 
those potentialities for social protest which have not yet reached the threshold of articulation in the public 
sphere due to dynamics of social control and oppression. This ‘categorical tool’, moreover, provides a key for 
the explanation of revolts that would otherwise seem to be only led by destructive rage, disclosing in this way 
the possibility, for the subjects involved, of a clearer and strategically more effective articulation of their 
normative claims. 
 
I. 
The conceptual foundations of the theory of recognition are initially outlined by Honneth on the spur of some 
critical reservations he felt towards Jürgen Habermas’ turn to universal pragmatics, as he retrospectively 
writes in the Introduction to The Fragmented World of the Social (Honneth 1995b). By rationally 
reconstructing the rules of interaction through language, Habermas aims at establishing the general and 
unavoidable presuppositions of communicative action in order to justify the normative stance of his theory 
and to provide an ideal model of justice in the form of a symmetrical and egalitarian speech situation. The 
new direction that Habermas imposes to his conception in the early 1970s, according to Honneth, involves a 
detachment between the moral-theoretical statements formulated in the theory and the level of the moral 
experiences concretely lived by the subjects in their everyday life. This detachment occurs because of the 
neo-Kantian, quasi-trascendental device now used to philosophically justify the theory: the universal 
pragmatics employed by Habermas enables a grasp of the normative presuppositions of social interaction only 
on the basis of rationally idealised rules of speech, causing in this way ‘a growing split between the level of 
moral philosophy and that of everyday social experience’ (Honneth 1995b: XIV). According to Honneth, 
Habermas’ abstracting move is made at the expense of a proper consideration of the domain of concrete moral 
experiences and of the emotionally connoted, situated perspective which human subjects cannot but assume 
when faced by something unjust. 
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Honneth’s idea is that a normative theory, which does not want to rescind its bond with the pre-theoretical 
social reality, must be able to account for the critical and emancipatory consciousness already present in the 
subjects’ everyday life. For this purpose, in his early essay ‘Moral Consciousness and Class Domination’ 
(Honneth 1995b) he begins inquiring into the moral expectations, the intuitively presupposed conceptions of 
justice and the normative reactions that characterise the ‘hidden morality’ of the working classes. In this task 
of providing a pre-scientific anchorage to his normative considerations, his primary sources are the writings 
of cultural theorists in the Marxist tradition such as E. P. Thompson, Barrington Moore, Richard Sennett and 
Richard Hoggart. ‘The effort to understand more precisely the manner in which morality is embedded in 
everyday social practice directs us first to historical and sociological studies that have been concerned with 
the moral conduct and reflection of members of social classes which traditionally have not specialised in the 
articulation of moral experiences’ (Honneth 1995b: XIV). The members of the middle and upper classes, in 
fact, are usually educated in a cultural climate permeated by references to universalistic ideals; furthermore, 
they are formed, for longer periods of time, in an educational system advancing requests to ‘depersonalize 
one’s norms of action’ (Honneth 1995b: 210) and to produce moral reasonings in response to abstract and 
general problems. Honneth, thus, aims at focusing his research on social classes in which the everyday moral 
practices appear more clearly and un-mediately than among the hegemonic ones. If the forms of morality that 
characterise these latter social strata can be described as self-consistent complexes of clearly formulated 
norms, specialised for the intellectual solution of hypothetical moral dilemmas, the ‘hidden moral culture of 
the working-classes’ is composed, on the contrary, by a varied set of situationally bound normative ideas, 
fragmentary perspectives on life and reactive moral norms. This form of moral culture is highly situated and 
constituted by elements apprehended through direct experience, reelaborated in informal discussions between 
members of the same social class, and cemented by a traditional and orally transmitted class ethics. Here we 
can mention the concept of ‘class culture’ that Honneth develops, in primary reference to the writings of 
Richard Hoggart, in his 1979 essay ‘Zur “latenten Biographie” von Arbeiterjugendlichen’ [‘On the “Latent 
Biography” of Working Class Youths’]. Against the objectivistic interpretations of Marxism which, in an all 
too deterministic and automatic fashion, make the features of the class culture of these social strata and the 
socialisation styles of their members immediately descend from the position these classes hold with respect to 
the means of production, Honneth highlights the capacity of the subjects – both on the collective and on the 
individual level – for re-elaborating the contents which are transmitted to them by the objective division in 
social strata. In this way, the condition of social subordination resulting from the relations of production – 
from which ‘class consciousness’ originates – is positively and spontaneously enriched by the working classes 
to form a specific ‘class-culture’ (Honneth et al. 1979: 933). Only if we highlight this cultural aspect of 
working class life does it become possible to grasp the primary source of the struggles and of the  
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forms of opposition that the concept of class consciousness aims at motivating.2 Through this culture-
theoretical analysis, a lively and dynamic environment can thus be uncovered, which is actively nourished 
and sustained by subjects who, even though subordinated in the power assets of society at large, have the 
opportunity of finding recognition from their peers in their own subcultural domain. Here they can pursue 
behavioural and expressive styles of proud ‘distinction’ from the dominant classes (Bourdieu 1984) and 
realise their ‘counterculture of compensatory respect’ – a concept that Honneth draws from The Hidden 
Injuries of Class, a volume published in 1972 by Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb (Sennett and Cobb 
1972: 85). In The Hidden Injuries of Class – as in the case of Richard Hoggart’s The Uses of Literacy, 
although for a different country and epoch – Sennett and Cobb document how most individuals of the lower 
strata come to develop in their living environments not only an oppositional class consciousness, but also, and 
primarily, a positive sense of social belonging, the awareness of being part of a neighborhood-based 
community of cooperation, and their own styles of expression, of behaviour and of handling of moral 
problems. On the basis of empirical observations, Honneth maintains in ‘Moral Consciousness and Class 
Domination’ that the intuitive morality of the lower social strata proves itself to be perfectly adequate to the 
concrete situations occurring in its context of generation. In other words, it is capable of solving the dilemmas 
that take place in working and everyday environments in a more convincing, complete and nuanced way than 
would be possible through the application, to these same situations, of abstract and universalistic moral 
reasonings (Honneth 1995b: 211). ‘When the social history of the working class concentrates upon normative 
ideals in the daily life of the industrial proletariat, it is more likely to encounter securely anchored feelings of 
injustice than clearly formulated, ethically grounded goals’ (209). In agreement with the concept delineated 
by Barrington Moore in his book Injustice (1978), Honneth calls this complex of reactive and situated 
normative demands ‘consciousness of injustice’ (209). The morality of the working classes, as contextually 
effective and lively as it may be, remains however ‘hidden’; not only to the eye of sociology, but also (and 
primarily) to that of the general public sphere. The normative claims at 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 This conception of the working-class culture seems implicitly to rest on E. P. Thompson’s definition of ‘social class’: There is 
today an ever-present temptation to suppose that class is a thing. This was not Marx’s meaning, in his own historical writing, yet the 
error vitiates much latter-day “Marxist” writing. “It”, the working class, is assumed to have a real existence, which can be defined 
almost mathematically – so many men who stand in a certain relation to the means of production. Once this is assumed it becomes 
possible to deduce the class-consciousness which “it” ought to have (but seldom does have), if “it” was properly aware of its own 
position and real interests . . . [I]t is easy to pass from this to some theory of substitution: the party, the sect, or theorist, who 
disclose class-consciousness, not as it is, but as it ought to be . . . If we remember that class is a relationship, and not a thing, we can 
not think in this way . . . Class is defined by men as they live their own history, and, in the end, this is the only definition’ (1963: 
10–11). 
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the basis of the moral reactions of the lower social strata are hindered, in their possibility of being publicly 
and incisively articulated, by a large number of strategies of control and manipulation carried out by the 
dominant classes. These strategies aim at limiting the possibility of the working class to express their 
normative claims in a proper and organised way and to receive attention in society: examples of these 
mechanisms of domination are the different weights often attributed, in informal discursive processes, to the 
contributions of persons in relation to the degree of schooling they show to hold, the institutional 
compensation for injustice in the form of material goods, or the vast complex of ‘processes of 
institutionalized individualization’ (214) – as the bestowing of social and political rewards for acts of 
individualistic risk taking, the destruction of neighborhood communities, or the establishment on the 
workplace of an ideology of competition and of individual efficiency. According to Honneth there can still be 
found, in the capitalistic societies of the 1980s, a whole domain of class-based struggles and resistance, 
despite the strategies of class domination carried out by the hegemonic classes to counteract the propagation 
of forms of emancipatory consciousness. Such a result leads the author of ‘Moral Consciousness and Class 
Domination’ to raise another objection to the works published by Jürgen Habermas a few years earlier 
(notably Habermas 1975). In these writings, Habermas states that the emancipatory potential of the lower 
classes has, in the end, been re-absorbed by state intervention. Accordingly, the last carrier-subject of a 
possible normative evolution of society through struggles and protests can only be found in the student 
movement and in those social groups which, in a climate of social-economical well-being, ‘learn to petition 
for the normative surplus of bourgeois moral universalism and to work toward a communicative ethic’ 
(Honneth 1995b: 206). On the basis of this – in Honneth’s view – questionable diagnosis, Habermas ends up 
taking as a paradigmatic model of his discourse ethics the forms of universalistic and ‘post-conventional’ 
morality peculiar to the dominant classes, without considering the fact that a cultural and educational 
monopoly is exerted, by the hegemonic classes, on these styles of moral expression. In this way, so reads 
Honneth’s objection, not only does Habermas get to ignore the hidden morality of the lower strata, but, 
moreover, unintentionally contributes to the strengthening of the strategies of domination that prevent the 
claims advanced by the working classes from being heard. The theme of the hidden morality of the lower 
classes is closely related to the concept of social recognition Honneth delineates for the first time in ‘Moral 
Consciousness and Class Domination’. As he tries to demonstrate with recourse to Barrington Moore’s 
Injustice and to Sennett and Cobb’s The Hidden Injuries of Class, social class conflicts do not only concern 
the unequal distribution of material goods. Consequently, they cannot be sedated by the institutions through 
mere economic compensations – and this explains why the compensatory strategies carried out by the 
capitalistic state have not defeated the hidden morality of the lower classes. Honneth maintains that the acts of 
struggle and resistance nourished by the ‘consciousness of injustice’ of the oppressed social strata are actually 
oriented, in the first instance and despite all the most common interpretations, to the achievement of 
‘opportunities for cultural education, social honour, and identity-guaranteeing work’,  
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and against the ‘asymmetrical distribution of cultural and psychological life chances’ (Honneth 1995b: 217–
18). Drawing on the situated and sub-cultural features of the hidden morality of the lower classes, Honneth 
describes the forms of conflict occurring in the friction areas between the classes as ‘struggles for social 
recognition’ through which the working subjects aim at obtaining an adequate recognition for their 
centerpiece role in the reproduction of society. The demand for recognition is the deepest core of the concrete 
justice claims through which the workers assert their right to the exercise of a properly waged, non-alienated 
work activity, in a context where their contribution to the social cooperation can be properly recognised; as in 
all those practical actions oriented towards demanding a work activity whose execution can be rationally 
controlled by the subject and involves the use of his knowledge and his professional skills, in which, in other 
words, he can avoid being reified into a component part of the machinery (Honneth 1995b: 219). 
II. 
The theme of social labor is at the center of the interpretation of the Marxian thought given by  Honneth in his 
early writings, an interpretation that focuses particularly on the works of the young Marx. In close reference 
to the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and to the German Ideology, Honneth underlines in 
Social Action and Human Nature (1980) the conceptual richness of the Marxian category of social labor: 
human beings can not only expand their control and knowledge of the external nature through their productive 
activity, but, moreover, labor enables them to form and express their internal world. ‘Labor is simultaneously 
a factor of both production and expression’ (Honneth and Joas 1988: 21). As Marx writes in the Paris 
Manuscripts, ‘the object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of man’s species life: for he duplicates 
himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he 
contemplates himself in a world that he has created’ (Marx 1988: 77). Human action assumes a social 
significance in labor. It configures a relation of the subject with external nature and, at the same time, with his 
inner nature and with the other subjects; ‘an immediate consequence’, thus, ‘of the fact that man is estranged 
from the product of his labor, from his lifeactivity, from his species being, is the estrangement of man from 
man . . . What applies to a man’s relation to his work, to the product of his labor and to himself, also holds of 
a man’s relation to the other man, and to the other man’s labor and object of labor’ (Marx 1988: 78). This 
concept of work, according to Honneth, determines the categorical structure of the Marxian theory of society 
not only in Marx’s early writings, in which it finds its clearest formulation, but even in his more mature 
works, where it apparently seems to have been forgotten in favour of the model, that Honneth deems 
reductively mechanistic, based on the evolutionary dialectic between productive forces and relations of 
production (Honneth 1995b: 26). In order to be able to describe, in the most direct way possible, the 
instrumentalised and alienated social relationships that take place in capitalistic societies, and to reflect on the 
repression of human subjectivity involved by this mode of production, the mature Marx – according to 
Honneth – 
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consciously and wittingly abstracts from the expressive and recognitive elements which he considered to be 
anthropologically rooted in the specifically human way of relating to nature through social labor (Honneth 
and Joas 1988: 4). The anthropological foundation and the value explicitly given to interaction through labor 
are not rejected in the later works; on the contrary, Marx applies in his analysis of capital a ‘methodologically 
conscious reductionism’ because ‘he wishes theoretically to expound only those domains of reality which 
have already been subsumed by the capitalist process of valorization’ (Honneth 1994: 100). The normative 
category of social labor remains in the background, as a criterion against which to bring out the reality of the 
capitalistic social alienation. In Honneth’s opinion, it is the frequent misunderstanding of the conscious 
abstraction performed by Marx which has often led, in the later tradition of historical materialism, to 
objectivist interpretations and prosecutions of Marxian thought (Honneth 1995b: 26). Honneth’s criticisms 
against Habermas in his essay ‘Work and Instrumental Action’ (Honneth 1995b) go in this direction. Here, he 
objects to the Habermasian concept of ‘instrumental action’, which includes work, as dangerously lacking of 
any internal normative implication. While the sphere of communicative action can count, from the moral 
standpoint, on the normative idea of communication free from domination, the sphere of instrumental action, 
as theorised by Habermas, is devoid of any inner normative criteria: ‘Habermas eliminates from his concept 
of work . . . that theoretical dimension on the basis of which Marx in his early, Hegelian writings interprets 
the act of work as a process objectifying human capabilities. For this lost dimension of meaning [he] provides 
no correlate’ (Honneth 1995b: 45). As a result, in Habermas’ theory it becomes impossible to differentiate 
between a free, non-alienated, uncoerced act of work and an alienated work activity, ‘in which neither the 
accompanying controls nor the object-related structuring of the activity is left to the initiative of the working 
subject’ (Honneth 1995b: 46). How distant such a theory locates itself from the social struggles aimed at 
demanding the right to a satisfying work activity emerges through the confrontation with the empirical 
researches, as evidenced by Philippe Bernoux, who documents the often small scale but persistent acts of 
resistance that the workers perform against the Tayloristic rationalisation of the production techniques 
(Honneth 1995b: 47). These daily practices of opposition usually consist of continuous, insistent violations to 
the norms and the rules of production enforced in the workplace, and only in particular occasions take the 
shape of openly articulated acts of protest. In consequence, such struggles usually remain below the threshold 
of expression that must be crossed before they can be detected by sociology and obtain the attention of public 
opinion. Nonetheless, by using more refined conceptual categories than those provided by Habermas, it is still 
possible to gain access to a vast domain of oppositional actions directed against the capitalistic organisation of 
labor and aimed at recovering the social contents of personal expression and of recognition that Marx had 
initially connected to the act of working. As we have seen, Honneth’s first reference to the theme of the 
struggles for recognition concerns the unequal opportunities available to social subjects, on the collective 
level, for conducting a life characterised by respect and selfesteem. At the basis of this conception lies the 
idea that individuals nourish 
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various kinds of moral expectations towards society. The first of these expectations is to receive adequate 
recognition, that is, to be accorded proper respect for one’s contribution to the social well-being. Even the 
struggles for material resources constitute claims for recognition, for the trigger to the moral opposition of the 
lower social groups demanding a rise of their economic status is not, according to Honneth, material 
deprivation as such; it is instead the perception, to that associated, that one’s contribution to the reproduction 
of society is not adequately recognised. Throwing the bases of his theorisation of the third sphere in The 
Struggle for Recognition and, more broadly, of his conception of the relation between economical 
redistribution and recognition, Honneth establishes a strong connection between demands for material goods 
and the idea of social esteem (Honneth 1984; 1995a: 165–68). The mediating concept between these two 
elements is Barrington Moore’s idea of ‘implicit social contract’ (Moore 1978: 10–45), which is an unwritten 
system of informal rules that determines the conditions of reciprocal recognition in a society, functioning as a 
base for the tacit normative consensus among the cooperating groups within the community. Each group has 
an implicitly recognised social status to which a determinate dignity and social esteem are tied, a sort of 
‘collective self-respect’. When the balance reached through this implicit consensus is disrupted due to the 
imposition, with force or fraud, of more disadvantageous conditions to the lower classes, the motivation for 
the practical opposition of these groups lies not only in the loss of economic status, but most of all in the lack 
of respect for the expectations of recognition they nourished towards society. In other words, in their 
awareness of not having been treated as equally legitimate members of the community which, by way of their 
consensus and their material contribution, they permit to reproduce. 
In The Struggle for Recognition, Honneth states that Barrington Moore’s concept of implicit social contract 
‘connects up with Thompson’s idea of a ‘moral economy’’ (Honneth 1995a: 167). He however maintains that 
the dynamics of social conflict are not understood, in E. P. Thompson’s writings, according to the model of a 
struggle for recognition. It is true, for Honneth, that in works like The Making of the English Working Class 
(1963) or ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century’ (1971) Thompson was led 
by the idea that social conflicts can never be merely a direct expression of experiences of economic 
deprivation and that they originate, instead, from the frustration of moral, collective expectations regarding 
the way in which society should be organised (Honneth 1995a: 166). Yet, in Thompson’s writings nothing 
leads, according to Honneth, to the hypothesis that every violation of an implicit social consensus is perceived 
by the affected subjects as a deprivation of recognition and, in consequence, as an offence to their feelings of 
self-worth. This is the reason why the reference to E. P. Thompson appears relatively late in Honneth’s 
works, when the fundamental lines of the paradigm of recognition have already been defined. 
Thompson, unlike the other cultural theorists Honneth refers to, is mentioned only in the 1989 essay 
‘Domination and Moral Struggle’ (Honneth 1995b: 7) and in the 1992 book The Struggle for Recognition, 
and here merely to explain why his theoretical proposal cannot be assumed as a main reference for the 
paradigm of recognition. 
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If, on the one hand, in Barrington Moore’s works (and especially in Injustice) fundamental importance is 
given to the theme of individual and collective self-relation, considered in its nexus with the human need for 
recognition, on the other hand it can hardly be stated, following Honneth’s reading, that in E. P. Thompson 
these elements are lacking. The reflections concerning the destruction of pre-capitalistic communities of 
recognition; the idea of a violation of the personal and collective dignity the subjects could acquire in that 
prior, more humane and cooperative way of living; the normative considerations on the relation between the 
practice of a ‘moral economy’ and the feelings of self-worth and self-respect it sustained in the individuals—
these are central aspects in E. P. Thompson’s writings, and on their basis it can be argued that the struggles 
undertaken by the workers against the capitalistic expansion, as depicted by Thompson, are indeed struggles 
for recognition. It is nonetheless possible, I think, to find a different reason why Honneth considered 
Barrington Moore a more suitable reference than E. P. Thompson for the elaboration of a theory of 
recognition. While E. P. Thompson’s studies are of prevalent historiographical character, Injustice, the book 
by Barrington Moore, which constitutes one of Honneth’s main influences, more closely follows a 
sociological approach. The idea of a ‘pan-human sense of injustice’, the concepts of ‘consciousness of 
injustice’ and of ‘implicit social contract’ elaborated by Barrington Moore, thanks to their general nature, 
easily seem more adequate at supporting Honneth’s foundational reflections on recognition than a 
historiographical kind of research like the one performed by Thompson. Barrington Moore, in Injustice, aims 
at deriving the category of a ‘pan-human sense of injustice’ (Moore 1978: 9) on the basis of a historical 
reconstruction of the social conflicts and revolutionary insurrections which took place in Germany between 
1848 and 1920, considered by the author as struggles for recognition and for a ‘decent human treatment’ 
(1978: 216, 224, 326). Moving from a conception of human nature according to which every subject is 
provided not only with physical needs, but also with the constitutive psychological necessity of ‘love and 
respect from other human beings’ (6), Barrington Moore outlines a concept of ‘natural morality’ (7). This 
represents the core of the more general conception of ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ present in every human being and 
contributes, together with the ‘social imperatives’ deriving from the necessity of human cohabitation, to orient 
the historically determined norms which regulate every society. Intrinsic to the ‘consciousness of injustice’ 
and to the sense of ‘moral outrage’ experienced by human subjects is always the ‘innate and natural’ 
opposition to suffering, to the denial of recognition and to oppression – unless, of course, this instinctual force 
is inhibited or distorted through forms of manipulation and coercion (1978: 89–108, 458–505). The pan-
human categories presented by Barrington Moore in Injustice constitute the theoretical bridge through which 
Honneth is able to bring out, in his writings of the mid-1980s, the universalistic character inherent in the 
concept of recognition (Honneth 1984); a concept of which he had only made use, until then, in his 
considerations on the moral culture of the industrial proletariat, without taking advantage of the potentialities 
it implied for the extension of his reflections beyond a specific social class. Particularly highlighted, in 
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Barrington Moore, is the fact that all human subjects, due to their intuitive consciousness of injustice, whose 
existence is a ‘pan-human or 
 
universal characteristic’, have the possibility of detecting moral wrongs and of reacting to them. As a result of 
Honneth’s heightened attention for the universalistic character of the idea of recognition, the scope of his 
reflections on normative conflict gets considerably widened: the concept of struggle for 
recognition no longer concerns only the acts of resistance undertaken by the working classes in the domain of 
social labor, but, potentially, all normatively justified forms of struggle. As the situated, fragmentary and 
counter-cultural morality of the lower classes is absorbed in Honneth’s new, more abstract and universally 
extended approach, the more prescriptive elements of his theory, concerning the general configuration of a 
‘just and good society’ based on recognition (Fraser and Honneth 2003), can finally be developed. We have 
come very close, in our reconstruction, to the all-encompassing systematisation of Honneth’s theoretical 
proposal, which takes place in The Struggle for Recognition (1992). In the years leading to this volume, 
however, Honneth increasingly distances himself from his previous interpretation of the Marxian thought, and 
moves closer to a position, in many respects, more similar to that of Habermas. 
III. 
A strong legacy of Honneth’s Marxist years remains nonetheless in the theory of recognition, as documented 
by the 1989 essay ‘Domination and Moral Struggle’. In this writing, Honneth rules out the idea that the 
Marxian paradigm can be renewed while keeping it faithful to the intentions and form it originally had. Some 
important aspects of it, however, can and should be followed through. In particular the fundamental Marxian 
intuition according to which, in Honneth’s words, class struggles are ‘a kind of moral conflict in which an 
oppressed class is fighting to achieve the social conditions for its self-respect’, is worth being relaunched 
within a more general paradigm of recognition (Honneth 1995b: 13). If the normative claims advanced by 
social groups change through history, the fact that individuals are willing to struggle in order to obtain the 
social presuppositions of their self-respect can be considered a historical constant, as already shown by the 
researches of Barrington Moore. What must be preserved of Marx’s theory is therefore the idea of history as 
an ongoing process of social conflicts. As Marx and Engels write in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, 
‘the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles’ (Marx and Engels 1948: 9) – in 
Honneth’s terminology, ‘struggles for recognition’, which on the level of social-historical development 
constitute the motive force of the moral evolution of society (Honneth 1995b: 14; 1995a: 168–69, 175). In the 
years immediately prior to The Critique of Power (1985), Honneth rejects his previous interpretation of the 
Marxian works and, in the wake of the reading presented by Habermas in Knowledge and Human Interests, 
starts considering Marx’s paradigm of labor as a reductionist theoretical model. This explains the only partial 
acceptance, in later writings, of the impulses deriving from the Marxian tradition he had previously utilised. 
Marx, with Habermas and the above-mentioned critical theorists, had been among the main influences in the 
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genesis of the paradigm of recognition. A similar change in Honneth’s perspective implies that, in The 
Struggle for Recognition, 
 
the role played by Marx in the research process leading to the establishment of the paradigm of recognition 
doesn’t come out in its full extent. Hegel is now the main reference in the exposition of Honneth’s theory, 
while Marx is criticised for having, in his early writings, ‘narrow[ed] Hegel’s model of the “struggle for 
recognition” in the direction of an aesthetics of production’ (Honneth 1995a: 148), and, in his more mature 
works, severed the tie between recognition and social labor by giving up his early and at any rate already 
reductionist conception. In Marx’s later works ‘individual self-realization through labor no longer 
automatically entails a recognizing reference to other subjects’ (149), and, since the theme of recognition has 
now been left aside, ‘in his analysis of capitalism he lets the laws of motion of the conflict be fixed – in 
accordance with his new set of basic concepts – by the antagonism of economic interests’ (149). In this way, 
class struggles are no longer conceived according to the moral model of conflicts for recognition, but merely 
as ‘a struggle for (economic) self-assertion’ (149). This shift of Honneth’s perspective towards Hegel 
provides him with the philosophical backing to elaborate a still monistic (as was Marx’s paradigm of labor), 
but internally differentiated theoretical model. Paralleling the structure of Hegel’s System of Ethical Life, 
Honneth retraces in contemporary societies the three historically-determined spheres of recognition, 
respectively related to affective relationships, to the system of modern law, and to social cooperation, that 
constitute the core of his paradigm (Honneth 1995a). One relevant drawback of this – fruitful, under other 
respects – change of textual references is that the Marxian themes concerning the material execution of 
working activities, which constitute one of the main focuses of Honneth’s early writings, significantly 
disappear from view (Smith 2009). Honneth’s attention is, in this phase, mainly devoted to ensuring the 
internal articulateness of his paradigm of recognition – a finality that brings him closer to the Hegelian model 
– while, at the same time, preserving the amount of formality requested by our post-traditional, internally-
differentiated societies – a task for which he finds one of his primary references in the Habermasian theory. In 
his latest book Das Recht der Freiheit, published in Germany in 2011, Honneth seems however to have at 
least partially reconsidered his views on the economicist reductionism he previously saw at work in Marx’s 
theory, as he describes the Marxian normative idea of society in terms of a model of ‘social freedom’. 
Honneth now understands the Marxian normative theory as a paradigm of social cooperation characterised by 
reciprocal relationships of recognition, in which every individual has the opportunity of pursuing his self-
realisation while collaborating to the reproduction of the universal, according to the Marxian idea that ‘the 
free development of each is the condition for the free development of all’ (Marx and Engels 1948: 31). Not 
only does Honneth propose the Marxian normative paradigm of social labor as an example of a conception 
based on social freedom, but, in discussing the recognitive sphere of work, he also returns to a typically 
Marxian theme which, although accorded great importance in his first writings, had subsequently receded into 
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the background behind the issue of recognition for individual achievement: the right of every subject to a 
satisfying, properly human and non-alienated execution of his work activity (Honneth 2011: 438–39). 
 
Since his early writings, as we have seen, Honneth pursues the search for a theoretical instrumentarium 
enabling the uncovering of the forms of injustice and social suffering not yet explicitly articulated in 
normative terms by the affected subjects, or the acts of resistance which have not yet crossed the threshold of 
publicly recognised emancipatory struggles. The ‘categorial tool’ (Fraser and Honneth 2003: 113) of 
recognition does not only offer a general and empirically demonstrated explanation for the phenomena of 
social protest of the past and present time but, moreover, it permits the detection of even those forms of 
discontent whose expression is, in various ways, hindered by structures of oppression. In this way, it can 
avoid the ‘unintended complicity with political domination’ (Fraser and Honneth 2003: 125) to which 
succumb all those theories that identify the whole spectrum of the current normative issues with the claims 
explicitly advanced in the public sphere by the most visible social movements, according to the moral 
languages conventionally accepted. The victims of the grossest injustices are frequently the same individuals 
who are less provided with the means and possibilities, in terms of material resources, cultural education and 
positive self-relation, to incisively denounce their situation. In consequence, for a critical social theory it 
becomes necessary to be equipped with conceptual instruments capable of discerning also the voices of the 
people who, otherwise, wouldn’t have a voice, in order to give to these subjects the opportunity of bringing 
their immediate ‘consciousness of injustice’ to the level of justice claims susceptible to obtain visibility in the 
public sphere (Deranty 2004). Not every struggle can be, of course, deemed as normative: social conflicts are 
to be determined as ‘normative struggles’, in Honneth’s theory, only when their motives and ends can be 
assessed as being morally justified in conformity with the universalistic principle of mutual recognition and 
its social articulations in the three spheres (Fraser and Honneth 2003: 144–45). If, on the one hand, not every 
struggle is based on normative principles, on the other hand the need for recognition constitutes the deepest 
core of every normative struggle. Even behind the seemingly most utilitarian demands for justice and the 
most strategically aware forms of normative conflict there is, on the part of the conflicting subjects, a need for 
recognition – at least implicitly. The subjects or the groups struggling against each other correspond, in 
Honneth’s view, to the ‘estranged parties’ which Habermas evokes in the Marxian interpretation he gives, in 
Knowledge and Human Interests, of the ‘dialectic of the moral life’ originally expounded by Hegel in The 
Spirit of Christianity and its Fate (Honneth 1991: 269–77; Habermas 1971: 56–60; Hegel 1961: 224–53). The 
estrangement between the subjects can be overcome, and both the conflicting parties can live a proper human 
life – that is, relating to the world in an unruptured and non-antagonistic way – only when the outcome of 
their struggle is not merely the gain of practical advantages, but real, mutual recognition with the other. 
Mutual recognition cannot, of course, be obtained only through a change in the relations of power; it requires 
the awareness, by the two parties, that hindering the other subject’s possibility of enjoying equal opportunities 
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for self-realisation means injuring one’s own self, and that awell-being founded on another’s deprivation, or 
on more or less overt antagonisms, is essentially imperfect and illusory. To reach this point, however, 
antagonistic struggle is often as necessary as discursive processes: the re-establishment 
 
through conflict of more balanced strength relations between the groups makes it impossible, to the formerly 
privileged group, to ignore the others’ argumentations by resting on consolidated positions of power. In the 
words of a classic study of social conflicts, ‘once the respective power of the contenders has been ascertained 
in and through conflict, a new equilibrium can be established and the relationship can proceed on this new 
basis’ (Coser 1964: 137). On these renewed foundations of more symmetrical power it becomes possible, in a 
longer or shorter period of time, to undertake the dialogical processes of reconciliation that can lead to a 
social cooperation sustained by everyone’s agreement, and, in this way, to come to an effective, mutual 
recognition (Presbey 2003). Honneth’s theory can offer a valuable contribution, both on the epistemic and the 
practical side, also in the eventuality of justified struggles whose normative character remains hidden behind 
collective acts of destructive rage, apparently devoid of moral contents and of a specific target. Honneth 
mentions, as an example of this, the riots carried out by the youths – mostly of immigrant descent – residing 
in the French banlieues. He interprets these revolts, conducted by marginalised and often unemployed people, 
as manifestations of resentment towards a society in which they feel hopeless and powerless:  
 
Even if these persons are legally recognized members of the society, they constantly live the experience of 
being invisible or superfluous. They are only regarded as groups statistically constituting a permanent menace 
for society or as a source of troubles. Their feeling of being considered by the other members of society as 
lacking any positive worth is, in my opinion, one of the main reasons for these revolts . . . Especially their 
normative expectations on the third principle, the one related to work, have been frustrated. (Honneth 2006: 
39) 
 
In the epistemic domain of Honneth’s theory, it becomes possible to look beyond the pointless destructivity, 
which apparently characterises these forms of conflict, without a priori discrediting them as mere expressions 
of aggressiveness, incompatible with the features of a democratic society. Only in this way can a route be 
opened to allow that, in the future, the social unrest at first expressed through these manifestations of rage can 
be elaborated and articulated in explicit demands of justice by the subjects involved, and denounced by means 
of strategically more effective forms of struggle. Honneth, moving from the theme of moral intuitions he 
references via Barrington Moore, thus gains access to a vast domain of normative claims, situations of social 
suffering and experiences of injustice which usually remain concealed from the eyes of the public opinion. 
His theory, thanks to the categorical instrument of recognition, avoids the risk of abstracting from the less 
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reassuring aspects of political reality, like domination and conflict, and of taking refuge in a domain of ideal 
principles disconnected from factuality. 
 
Normative social struggles are a possible indicator of situations of oppression and a concrete factor of 
emancipatory opposition against the forms of domination present in society; for this reason a theoretical 
paradigm wanting to preserve its critical strength ought to inquire into their generative dynamics and ways of 
articulation. This consideration for the chaotic, vital and ever-changing reality of the societies we live in 
constitutes one of the strong points of the paradigm of recognition; and represents one of the aspects in which 
the fruitful encounter of Marxism and Cultural Studies, so valuable for the very elaboration of the conceptual 
core of Honneth’s theory, appears at its best. 
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